olving communities in rural tourism:

Α "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model" methodological approach

Case studies: Women Rural Tourism Cooperatives:

(a)   GARGALIANI, Peloponnesus Area (South-West GR)

(b)   WERT (Women Entrepreneurs in Rural Tourism) EU Program : win – win –win papakonstantinidis model”  as a recognized (in European- WERT net- level)  rural tourism methodological tool

Prof. Dr. Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis,

President of the Local Government Dept / d. Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Management  

The Higher Technological Educational Institute of Peloponnesus Greece

Abstract

The aim of this presentation is both to examine whether community participation in sustainable rural tourism promotes the local-rural development or not, and investigate the potential evolutions and research challenges on the rural-local development process, by using the "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model" methodological approach: It is a "triple pole" continuous local bargaining approach, concerning "the real assets of a region" : The real assets of a region are the actors, the entrepreneurs, the politicians, the work force, organizations and institutions, their material and financial resources and the specific regional culture of co-operation communication and competition. This model has been specified by the “Spais- Papakonstntinidis -Papakonstantinidis model, applied in the field of marketing.   The main hypothesis, in this presentation is that development may be sighted as the output of the bargaining trends, inside the community. From this point of view, Local Development as a local management process tables a number of questions, mainly concerned on conflict resolution between the 3 power local poles, i.e (a) local people and their local movements/lobbies, addressed to the rural tourism and other local activities, mainly as tourism services providers (b) Local Authorities and (c) tourism services consumers  As the 3 poles are in a constant negotiations, then each of them should prevailed over the other 2, thus introducing in the bargaining problem, as Nash and alle have described. Bargaining behavior must therefore be defined The suggested "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model conceptualization (coming from Nash win-win extended approach) tries to find ways for the 3-poles bargaining conceptual equilibria, under conditions, thus maximizing expected utilities for all the involved parts in local decision making In a practical level, investigating the potential evolutions and research challenges of this topic, it should be supported that, public involvement -in terms of "knowledge creation" and "pure individual strategies", concerned with Rural Tourism-Rural Development is conducted. Involving local people in the development process round a local "Flag Theme" is therefore necessary. In particular this presentation focuses on the sensitization process as the reaction to given information, which influences the socio-economic behaviour in the local bargain. Therefore "public participation" is the key-point. Public participation presupposes that a methodological approach could be applied in the rural area, by easy steps towards motivating local people and involving the Community. This methodological approach includes 5 steps, i.e information, sensitization, participation, involvement and partnership, in its main version, based on the "bottom-up" approach, the local "team-psychology" creation and the local people motivation, towards developing their place: a "new" behavior local standard may be resulted, such as each of the three rural tourism parts (local People, local Authorities and tourism services Consumers (P.A.C) ) to win according to the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model. At last, 2 successful case-studies concerned rural – community development due to rural tourism based on the win-win-win methodological process, are been analyzed in this presentation thus justified the above theoretical view

Key-words

Sustainability, Local Development, Rural Tourism, triple-pole Bargain, Mixed Strategies Sensitization, participation, public involvement, flag theme, behaviour information, win-win-win papakonstantinidis model, local authorities, providers-consumers the tourism services

BIOSKETCH

Dr. Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis, Professor of Regional and Local Dev  The President of the Local Government Dept, deputy Dean of Faculty of “Management and Economics”- The Higher Technological Educational Institute (HTEI)  of Peloponnesus -Antikalamos, 24.100 Kalamata, Greece. lpap@teikal.gr , papakon@gmail.com

Lawyer, Economist, Mathematician,  earned a First Class First in his M.Sc (Honours) in Regional Development, M. Sc  in Rural Development, Ph. D in Local Development,  He is the writer of  (17) monographies-(77) papers published,115 active participations in world and european conferences 51 research programs in the fields of local development and the rural tourism, 25 notes and manuals  Head of the "Local Development Office"-Agricultural Bank of Greece (1991 -2001), Member of the Research and Planning Division A.B.G (1978-1990), General Reporter of the E.U C.E.E.P (Social Fund) "Regional Affairs Committee"(1990-1995), member of the E.U Commission task force for the L.E.A.D.E.R E.U Initiative- DG VI (AGRI) (1991-1992), member of the E.U Commission "Green Team" (DG X). He is also Professor of the National Centre for Public Administration and Local Government. He is aqn active member of the scientific team of the PRISMA Development Sudies S.AHe serves as a member on the editorial board of the Journal of Applied Economics and Management (JENSEN/India) and as a track chair in bargaining for the (4^th and 5^th Annual Euromed Conferences of EMAB. He has taught extensively as a visiting professor (in postgraduate level) in topics related to bargaining in regional development and social sustainable development at the University of Aegean (Greece), Santo Tomas University (Philippines), School of Management (Klaipeda, Lithuania) and the Centre for Economic and Social Development (Baku, Azerbaijan).Awarded by the “Great Benefactors” Prize for his work  poor and isolated  Greek Rural Areas(2010), Honorary Citizen in Peloponnesus’ Gargaliani  area and 12 other small cities, all over Greece  for the same reason,  and also 3 times (1982,1983,1984) by the JCI TOYP (Ten Outstanding Young Persons) and the “Senate” title  (2010) 

EPILOG

Tripolar strategic structure and the Impossibility Theorem

Building a tripolar economic relation based on the sensitization process, it has been acceptable, as a “social need”: According to the suggested model, strengthening of the third "win" in an extending "non cooperative win-win game" situation leads to a new bargaining behavior, which is step  by step born locally  Triopoly seems to empower the “intermediate position, or the 3rd win, for the reasons that : (a) According to Cournot Theorem,  This situation reflects  the Principles of the Absolute Competition (the invisible Hand of the Market /Adam Smith, 1760)  of maximizing the social justice (higher production in the lowest price) and so the social welfare: The maximum potential amount of goods at lower price approaching marginal cost of production  (P=MC=MR), but (b) Theocharis (1959) pointed out that an oligopoly system with n players would be only neutrally stable for three players (n=3) and unstable for four and more players: (c) Combining (a) ,(b)   “triopoly” seems to be the best market toward social welfare and at the same time is a more realistic market Each of the 3PAC seeks to maximize individual profit, but, at the same time, each of them has more little power (in comparison with duopoly -2 competitors) to affect this market, even if it is based on the "best responses" philosophy. That means, more production, less prices, less possibility to make coalitions or collusions, more transparency Furthermore, in the suggested model, each of the three, making choices under uncertainty, has more probability for expectations of success:

Each of them has three possibilities (instead of 2) on each trial, thus forming the utility function:  

The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is (a) a methodological tool for conflict resolution, especially in the case of decision-making, (b) a “path” to social justice, (c) the basic process for sensitizing local population on the development, around a local “flag theme” (d) a way to “feel free” through involvement in the development process (e) to develop “new” bargaining behavior (f) to convert conflict into cooperation. (g) As the sensitization process tends to infinity, then the limit of PAC relations tend to the absolute collaboration. That’s the end of the real development process

Finally, I wonder  ‘if and under what conditions, the “win-win-win” approach (locally, at least) should  in a position to face the classical “Impossibility Theorem” (Kenneth Arrow, 1951)  and thus to produce  social welfare  During the 50s Kenneth Arrow, argued that there is no “social welfare”, as there is no “social conscience” as there is no  rank-order voting systems, for the reasons that (a) If every voter prefers alternative X over alternative Y, then the group prefers X over Y (b) If every voter's preference between X and Y remains unchanged, then the group's preference between X and Y will also remain unchanged (even if voters' preferences between other pairs like X and Z, Y and Z, or Z and W change) (c) There is no "dictator": no single voter possesses the power to always determine the group's preference. Despite its accessibility, I think that there is only one case (in the conceptual level), of not applicable In a pure theoretical situation this will be done: The limit of the "win-win-win  papakonstantinidis model" as  the  sensitization process tends to infinity, is the ultimate collaboration. In that ideal case, X=Y=Z=W That’s the end of the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” Even if impossible to go to the end, this model  provides the PAC members with a direction toward community development due to rural tourism This is not a wish It is a goal, It's life  . We owe it   to the next generation

●

Case Studies:

1. 1.      Rural Tourism Women Cooperative –Gargaliani

Gargaliani  is a small town (typical  case of a Greek traditional  place)  in Trifilia District( South-West  Peloponnesus)  with increasing population’s rate  9083 (2011)    5.500 (2001) It is located in a plain, near  Marathos, a  popular destination for both  Greek and foreign tourists. Until 2002 local people were employed , basically in the agricultural sector (oil olives, raisin,  vegetables etc), fishing  and tourism activities, during the summer, with  a very low average  annual  income, between 1,500 and 1,800 euro In November of 2002 the   E.U Commission “Local Integrated Program” project organized a 3-months training course for local women related to the challenges and opportunities of rural tourism development I suggested the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” as an experimental methodological tool for sensitizing these women, to work around the local “flag theme”  It was its first application in rural space. This model was launched on Aug 2002 in Gotland Island-SW Fifty (50) women took part and this led to the formation of the “Gargaliani Women’s Rural Tourism Cooperative”, which started with 35 members  and then, 50 The aim of the cooperative was to support the local economy; to provide a supplementary income to women in the area; and to improve the social status and cultural level of women villagers During the 3-months training course, the “tacit” knowledge was transferred by the EU experts, to these women, in the form of conceptual and then to “codified” knowledge, through the “collective choice game”. Coming from different places (sea coast, plain, mountain places) the 50 women had different interests, as well as, different thoughts about the “form” and the kind of cooperative creation. During the training, coalitions were being formed, as a “team psychology” between these women. Then  they encouraged to obtain a common goal which was  local development, As a result -choosing the rural tourism as a flag-theme- helped them to converge their efforts toward implementing this goal  This process worked as an incentive to the   people locally  to be involved  in  the local development process  through the spillover effect    One and half month after starting the training course, women had already decided  on what they had to do    through the  collective choice  psychological approach : (a) To create a cooperative mainly engaged in the production of traditional sweets, food and drinks with traditional recipes and pure material to provide authentic and unique tastes. The cooperative started in the very early of 2003, supported by the new mayor Among the delicacies they produce, are sweets, as “pate” jams and conserves made of seasonal fruit; pastries and other traditional food, cheese pies The cooperative also promotes traditional  local customs through organizing weddings, christenings and other public celebrations, planned in a way that marks the area’s cultural identity They provide catering services  to conferences in and outside the area of municipality (with its local departments) Over the time, the women succeeded in building a team spirit encouraged by a small group of younger inhabitants, who acted as an “animator team” under the supervision  of an outside expert (in particular, the author)  Through the game of “collective choice” (a win-win-win rural tourism application)  they found their “flag theme” (Papakonstantinidis, 2002, p. 322-“the magic way” & 2003, p.359 ) namely, the home-made sweets to promote the local identity  and “family games” in preparing meals and sweets which are offered during  the first days of August as a cultural activity for tourists. Awareness of local problems needs and resources was raised among the local community. People got involved in the decision making process  regarding future development of their area through a “business plan” composed in the context of  the “Urban Development” E.U Program/Initiative, formed a Local Action Group and started to ask for financial resources. Now the women cooperative has 35 women and the average annual income per family gas increased by 20.000 Euro Moreover, young people have begun to return to Gargaliani and the only primary school in the small town which was planned to close, due to lack of children has stayed open. I've been declared Honorary Citizen, of this town, for this work, some years later (2009)- see p.p

1. 2.      The WERT European Rural Tourism Project

The Women Entrepreneurs in Rural Tourism' project (WERT) is a collaborative partnership between eight training institutions and networks from six countries across Europe (DESTI NET, 2012). From the Greek side, “PRISMA Development Studies S.A”  with a very  important  contribution in the rural development in Greece, was the WERT partner The project is supported by the European Union through the Leonardo da Vinci programme, aimed at improving the vocational education systems of Europe. The project aims to meet the needs and build the skills of women entrepreneurs involved in rural tourism and crafts and to improve the quality of training provided by the vocational education sector. The WERT training programme developed within this pilot initiative is aimed to help the following groups (a)Women entrepreneurs involved in rural tourism, crafts and food production (b)Women who wish to enter the sector in order to become economically active and independent (c) Vocational training providers to help women entrepreneurs develop the required business skills e.g. Management, Information Technology and Marketing The WERT training course help women entrepreneurs across Europe to build new skills and jobs in rural economies During the period March-June 2012, twenty two (22) Women candidate entrepreneurs in Rural Tourism in a small Greek village, “Rovies” (Evia Island, Middle Greece) were trained on how it should be possible to work together in the rural tourism I was invited by the PRISMA Development Studies SA to work as trainer, in Rovies-Evia Isle.  During the 3-months training, I had the chance to develop the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” as methodological tool for producing the conditions of closer collaboration among them After training, the 22 women established a rural tourism cooperative, covering not only “accommodation”, but also “local food and sweets”, “cultural activities”, swimming/climbing activities etc After training, the 22 women established a rural tourism cooperative, covering not only “accommodation”, but also “local food and sweets”, “cultural activities”, swimming/climbing activities etc  so that  they have obtained a higher income (2012) The success of the Agricultural Co Rovies of Evia, mobilized the entire endogenous potential of the village, involving residents in the development process In its final evaluation in Crete (Greece), WERT evaluated the experiment as  a successful one because it led in the creation of Women Cooperative The project leader  of the WERT Dr Rosaleen Courtney Planning and Development (Norton Radstock College South Hill Park Radstock BA3 3RW UK)  asked from me the “Power Point” copy  to include it in the educational material WERT (e-school training) This  material is now presented simultaneously to all actors involved in the educational process WERT  (this material is attached to my presentation)

Athens, July 5, 2013

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e- addresses:

(i)                 (http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index_el.htm EUROPA Summaries of EU Legislation

(ii)               http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 /April 24

APPENDIX:

Appendix note 1

The suggestion

Appendix note 2: triopoly

Starting from

The inverse demand function:  we have

                                                                                                                              (1)

Total Revenue from rural tourism services firm (RTSF) 1 is   (PxQ = rectangle area)

PQ₁ = aQ₁ – bQ₁² – bQ₁Q₂ –bQ₁Q₃

Total Revenue for (RTSF)   2 is

PQ₂ = aQ₂ – bQ₂² – bQ₁Q₂ –bQ1Q3

Total Revenue for (RTSF) 3 is

PQ₃= aQ₃- bQ₁Q₃-bQ₂Q₃-bQ₃²

Marginal revenues for (RTSF) 1 and 2 and 3

Total Revenues for (RTSF) 1 and 2 and 3

TR₁= PQ₁ = aQ₁ – bQ₁² – bQ₁Q₂ –bQ₁Q₃

TR₃ = PQ₃= aQ₃- bQ₁Q₃-bQ₂Q₃-bQ₃²

PQ₂ = aQ₂ – bQ₂² – bQ₁Q₂ –bQ₁Q₃

Each (RTSF) marginal revenue (MR) depends on the output supplied by the other (RTSF)

Equilibrium quantities must come from maximization the total Profit Π

In that point: Π = ΤR – TC

Maximizing Π

Π(Q)=max →dΠ/dQ=0

Golden rule of profit maximization says get the output from the intersection of MC and MR

Steps:

So, For (RTSF) 1       

 Q1 = best response for Q2+Q3

This is called (RTSF) 1’s best response function

But,

Q1 depends on Q2 and Q3

All the three (RTSF) supply the market with identical products (tourism services)

So if the RTSF 1 produces more tourism services è (RTSF)   2 and 3 must produce less than ideal

Best-Response Function for a Cournot TRIOPOLY

(RTSF) 1’ best-response function is (c)_1,  = (RTSF) 2’s+ (RTSF) 3’s  MC)

Similarly, (RTSF) 2’ best-response function is (c)_2,  = (RTSF) 1’s+ (RTSF) 3’s  MC)

 (RTSF) 3’ best-response function is (c)_3,  is (RTSF) 2’s + RTSF) 1’MC)

FINALLY,

Cournot equilibrium:  A point where the three (3) best-response functions intersect in a 3D space

(Equilibrium point in a 3D space)